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Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional
Protections for Sexual Privacyt
Juu A. MoRRIs*

INTRODUCTION

The 1986 Supreme Court decision of Bowers v. Hardwick' effectively
ended federal constitutional law challenges to state sodomy statutes. The
Court rejected Hardwick's substantive due process argument in stating that
the rights announced in the chain of cases beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut2 bore no "resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of'3
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case."
The concurring 4 and dissenting5 opinions in Hardwick suggest the possibility
of other federal law challenges, particularly under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, courts which have considered
these challenges have refused to recognize that lesbians and gay men
constitute a group deserving the protection of heightened scrutiny6 available

t @ Copyright 1991 by Juli A. Moms.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1988,
Indiana University at Bloomington.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right of married couples to use contraception). Tins line of
cases is generally thought to include Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right of women
to decide whether to bear a child; the right to an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (the right of unmamed couples to use contraception); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (the right to private possession of obscene materials); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right of a parent to control the education and rearing of a child).
3. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91. Federal privacy protection has traditionally been limited
to the realms of family, marriage and procreation. The Court in Hardwick concluded that
these were categories to wich private and consensual sex acts between homosexuals cannot
belong. Id. at 191.
4. Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the eighth amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause may be implicated where, as m tins case, the statute at issue
authorized up to twenty years imprisonment upon conviction for engaging in a single, private,
consensual act of sodomy).
5. Id. at 199, 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that claims based on the equal
protection clause and the eighth and ninth amendments should have been considered by the

Court).
6. See Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 U. BAJT. L. REv.
47, 58 (1979). But see Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). For an
argument that sodomy laws themselves violate the equal protection guarantee, see Note, The
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YA.LE L.J. 145 (1988).
Most courts that refuse to extend equal protection to gays base their decisions on their view
of the mutability of sexual preference. Since United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938), a determination that a classification is suspect has depended on a finding of stigma,
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to groups such as those classified on the basis of race, alienage, national
origin, sex and illegitimacy.7 Thus, under current federal law analysis, a
finding of heightened scrutiny would appear necessary to any successful
equal protection challenge. In fact, several courts have held that Hardwick's
refusal to recognize a fundamental right in the context of lesbian and gay
lifestyles is binding precedent in equal protection analysis.' Because federal
challenges are now precluded, gay rights advocates are limited to challenges
at the state level. Most legislative repeal of sodomy statutes has occurred
since 1970, but that movement seems to have lost momentum in the 1980s.9

unequal treatment, immutability, and discreteness and insularity. Id. at 152 n.4. Until recently,
gay rights advocates have fairly consistently argued that sexual orientation is fixed either at
birth or within the first few years of life. See Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. 797, 818 (1984). Court decisions, however, have relied on conflicting reports from
the scientific community in finding that the origins of homosexuality cannot be empirically
determined and therefore, since homosexuality may not be immutable, classifications based on
sexual preference are not suspect. See generally id.; Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick: Balancing
the Interests of the Moral Order and Individual Liberty, 16 Curi. L. REv. 555 (1986) (noting
that the Court has limited the definition of immutability to characteristics which one is born
with and which are beyond one's control). For an analysis of why immutability is not required
by equal protection precedents and for a framework for adopting a process-based argument
that would protect the dialogue that generates group identity (focusing on the classification,
not defining a class by the acts of its members), see Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Toward
Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Ray. 915 (1989).
7. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race as a suspect classification meriting
strict scrutiny); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race as a suspect classification);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage as a suspect classification); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin as a suspect classification); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex as a quasi-suspect classification meriting intermediate scrutiny);
Lali v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (subjecting classifications based on illegitimacy to intermediate
scrutiny).
8. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Other cases in which courts
have advanced this argument include: Gay Inmates of Shelby County Jail v. Barksdale, No.
84-5666 (6th Cir. June 1, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1984); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 290, 295, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (1987); cf. Gay and Lesbian
Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1057 (W.D. Ark. 1987), rev'd, 850 F.2d 361. (8th
Cir. 1988). But see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190; Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 847 F.2d 1362 (1988),
withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (specifically rejecting this argument and criticizing the oversimplification of the structure of the fourteenth amendment); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508,
1522 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 482 U.S. 913 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 486
U.S. 592 (1988); benShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1361, 1368-69 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part and vacated.in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Swift v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1986); benShalom v. Secretary
of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980). For a sustained and forceful critique of
arguments that conflate due process with equal protection in this context, see Sunstein, Sexual
Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
9. Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity,
40 U. MLva L. REv. 521, 526-27 (1986).

1991]

CHALLENGING SODOMY STATUTES

Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still make private, consensual sodomy a criminal offense.10 Combatting prejudice and discrimination
in the political arena is fraught with far-reaching difficulties:
[When [lesbians and gay men] voluntarily adopt or involuntarily bear
the public identity 'homosexual' and for that reason lose their employment and other public benefits, housing, custody of children, resident
alien status, medical insurance, and even physical safety, they are
hindered and deterred from entering the public debate surrounding the
sodomy laws. The harms they suffer interfere sharply, albeit indirectly,
with the political process."
As a result, state-level challenges to sodomy statutes must now delve into
the largely untested waters of state constitutional law.
A few state courts have relied on the interpretation of state constitutional
provisions to extend protection for individual rights beyond the limits
recognized in federal jurisprudence.' 2 This Note will examine the methods
used by those courts in the context of sodomy statutes and will point out
the underlying theories of state legislative authority, homosexual identity
and privacy on which state courts rely in determining the protection due
lesbians and gay men. This Note will then review the jurisprudence surrounding select state constitutional privacy and equal protection provisions
and will suggest possible avenues for challenging the validity of sodomy
statutes under those provisions.

I.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY RIGHTS

Justice Brennan argued in 1977 that "[s]tate constitutions ... are a font
of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those

10. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); Aiuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1989);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-6-2 (1988); IDAHo CODE'§ 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. AN. § 21-3505 (1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986);
MD. CRi. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 553, 554 (1987); McH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (West
1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 14-177 (1988); OrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Coop. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988). Florida now
punishes sodomy under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976) (deviate sexual intercourse)
after its sodomy statute (§ 800.01) was declared unconstitutionally vague by the Florida
Supreme Court. Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 '(Fla. 1971).
11. Halley, supra note 6, at 918. To be sure, state constitutional law challenges to sodomy
statutes have their own political component in that state judges can be as susceptible to
political pressure as state legislators. See Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. ToL. L. REv. 465, 469-73 (1985).
12. Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 1324, 1433-34 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
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While the

methods and theories of state constitutional law have generated considerable
interest among scholars, 14 most courts faced with claims based on state
constitutions adopt a posture of noninterpretation. 5 A small number of
state courts, however, have developed state constitutional privacy and equal

protection doctrines and have interpreted them to hold that sodomy statutes
violate the rights of lesbians and gay men.

A.

State Law Privacy Rights and the New Jersey Courts

In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the
New Jersey Constitution included a right to privacy 6 that allowed the

parents of a comatose woman to decide whether to remove her from a life
support system.' 7 The court had laid the groundwork for such a politically

hazardous extension of privacy rights by expressing its dissatisfaction with
federal precedent in two less emotionally charged forums.
The court held in Robinson v. Cahill'8 that a method of school financing,

which based allocations to a particular district on the real property taxes
collected from that district, violated the state's equal protection clause,

9

even though the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez2° upheld a similar method of financing. Close on the heels of
the New Jersey court's 1973 decision, the court extended protection under
the state constitution's search and seizure clause 2' beyond that required by

13. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 491 (1977).
14. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1356-67, 1384-98; Eichbaum,
Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of
Familial Privacy, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979) (competing tensions between familybased and autonomy-based theories of privacy); Halley, supra note 6 (political circumstances
so infect the process by which antihomosexual legislation has been passed that process-based
equal protection scrutiny is both necessary and justified); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1281 (1977) (the
influence of contractarian moral theory on the federal constitution); Comment, State v. Reeves:
Interpreting Louisiana's ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 44 LA. L. Rav. 183 (1983).
15. Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1438. Courts often abstain from construing
state constitutional privacy provisions by basing their decisions on federal law. Federal law
also affects the disposition of state law claims because courts which frequently use federal
precedent as guidance in construing state provisions construct state law doctrines that closely
track federal law (thus risking instability in state law if subsequent federal cases change
direction) and because courts implicitly reinterpret federal precedent to justify creating privacy
rights that are rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1434-43.
16. See N.J. CONST. art. I, para. I ("All persons are by nature free and independent, and
have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty ... and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.").
17. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
18.
19.
20.
21.

62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7.
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the United States Supreme Court. 22 In State v. Johnson,23 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the state must prove that a defendant waived a

known constitutional right before evidence obtained in a consensual search
is admissible. In both cases, as in In re Quinlan,24 the New Jersey court
filled the gap in federal protection through an extension of state constitutional guarantees of individual rights. This "gap-filling" approach has been
termed "interstitial" and it allows state courts to "tinker with the federal

floors" to interpose "an additional layer of protection
between individual
'
rights and the oppressive potential of the state.' 2

One year after Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.

Saunders26 again extended the limits of the protection available under New
Jersey's constitutional right to privacy beyond that available under federal
privacy law. The court in Saunders held that New Jersey's fornication

statute 7 violated the state constitution's right to privacy, despite a less than
ideal factual situation. 2 The court relied on its interpretation of the New

Jersey right to privacy in Quinlan and did not ground its decision on
protection of federal privacy rights. 29 Instead, the court implemented an

autonomy-based view of individual rights that constitutes the most important
and distinguishing feature of its decision in terms of creating future state
constitutional privacy rights for lesbians and gay men.3 0

22. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (finding admissible evidence obtained
in a supposedly consensual search without requiring the state to show that the defendant
waived a known constitutional right).
23. 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
24. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see supra note 17 and
accompanying text (discussing Quinlan).
25. Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1357, 1363. This article provides an
extensive discussion of interstitial and other methods of state constitutional interpretation. See
id. at 1356-59.
26. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
27. N.J: STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1 (West 1985) (repealed 1979).
28. "[I]ndiscriminate group fornicating by-or indeed, among-complete strangers exhibiting remarkable dexterity in the confined quarters of a parked automobile on a deserted lot
in Newark" is not an ideal foundation for constitutional principles. Saunders, 75 N.J. at 228,
381 A.2d at 346-47 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The defendants in this case were charged with
rape but convicted of the lesser included offense of fornication with prostitutes.
29. Indeed, the Saunders court pointed out the fact that the "Quinlan decision could not
have been predicated on privacy grounds if the class of cognizable privacy interests was limited
to personal decisions concerning procreative matters." Id. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339.
In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977), the United States Supreme
Court specifically reserved the question of whether fornication was protected by federal privacy
law.
30. The concluding paragraphs of the court's decision in Saunders eloquently describe the
autonomy-based model of privacy and its limitations on legislative authority and police power
so necessary to avoid the consequences of Hardwick:
Our conclusion today extends no further than to strike down a measure which
has as its objective the regulation of private morality. To the extent that [the
fornication statute] serves as an official sanction of certain conceptions of
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Once the court determined that state constitutional privacy rights were
violated by the fornication statute, the Saunders court examined the justifications put forth by the state to consider whether they could constitute a
compelling state interest. The justices found that the state's interests in
protecting the institution of marriage, preventing illegitimate children and the
spread of venereal disease and upholding public morality did not rise to the
level of "compelling." 31 One year later the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, extended the rights protected in Saunders to invalidate
New Jersey's sodomy statute 2 in State v. Ciuffini.3 Because of these decisions,
the legislative authority and police power of the state of New Jersey no longer
extend to the regulation of adult, private, consensual sexual behavior.
A final important consideration present in the New Jersey cases is the care
4
taken to base these decisions on adequate and independent state grounds.

desirable lifestyles, social mores or individualized beliefs, it is not an appropriate
exercise of the police power.
Fornication may be abhorrent to the morals and deeply held beliefs of many
persons. But any appropriate "remedy" for such conduct cannot come from
legislative fiat. Private personal acts between two consenting adults are not to be
lightly meddled with by the State. The right of personal autonomy is fundamental
to a free society. Persons who view fornication as opprobrious conduct may seek
strenuously to dissuade people from engaging in it. However, they may not
inhibit such conduct through the coercive power of the criminal law. As aptly
stated by Sir Francis Bacon, "ftihe sum of behavior is to retain a man's own
dignity without intruding on the liberty of others." The fornication statute mocks
the dignity of both offenders and enforcers. Surely police have more pressing
duties than to search out adults who live a so-called "wayward" life. Surely the
dignity of the law is undermined when an intimate personal activity between
consenting adults can be dragged into court and "exposed." More importantly,
the liberty which is the birthright of every individual suffers dearly when the
State can so grossly intrude on personal autonomy.
Saunders, 75 N.J. at 219-20, 381 A.2d at 342-43 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341. The court found that, although the benefits of marriage
were substantial, the state could not legitimately regulate private sexual expression or use the
police power to force couples to the altar. Id. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342. Also, the court
reasoned that the threat of a $50 fine levied very rarely could hardly reduce the number of
illegitimate children more effectively than contraceptives, and that the threat of prosecution
would only hinder those afflicted with venereal diseases from obtaining treatment and thus
aid the spread of such diseases. Id. at 218-19, 381 A.2d at 341-42.
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 to 143-2 (West 1985) (repealed 1979). New Jersey
decriminalized adult, private, consensual homosexual behavior in 1978. New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice ch. 95, §§ 14:1-3, 1978 N.J. Laws 482, 547-50 (codified as amended at N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-1 to 14-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)).
33. 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (1978).
34. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). If a state court bases its decision
completely on federal law or does not clearly engage in decision-making based on adequate
and independent state grounds, the Supreme Court will assume that the decision was based
on federal doctrine. Id. at 1040-41.
The consequences of falling to argue in depth the state constitutional dimensions of privacy
are illustrated in State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) ("[W]ithout the
parties having addressed the distinct nature of Missouri's right of privacy apart from federal
doctrines, we decline to decide this case on ,that basis.").
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Doing so insulates these decisions from United States Supreme Court review.3
Thus, the New Jersey courts have succeeded in extending the "federal floor"
to protect lesbians and gay men by developing their own state constitutional
jurisprudence of privacy rights. A state jurisprudence will protect the politiCourt seems to
cally and socially disadvantaged at a time when the3 Supreme
6
be retreating from its commitment to these groups.

B. Potential Applications of the New Jersey Model
37
Ten states explicitly protect the right to privacy in their state constitutions.
Of these states, five still criminalize adult, private, consensual sodomy.39 At
least five state courts confronted with state constitutional privacy challenges
to sexual practice regulations have held the statutes to be unconstitutional. 9

35. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
36. See Comment, The Louisiana Constitution's Declaration of Rights: Post-Hardwick
Protection for Sexual Privacy?, 62 Tut. L. REv. 767, 790-91 (1988); see also id. at 786-91
(containing an extensive analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court's treatment of state law
privacy rights).
37. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § I
("All people . .. have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy,"); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein."); HAw. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7; ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; LA. CoNsT. art. I, §
5 ("Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers,
and effects against . . . invasions of privacy."); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CoNsT. art.
I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Other states that have created a jurisprudence of privacy have done so, for the most part,
by extending due process rights in a fashion analogous to federal privacy law. Developments
in the Law, supra note 12, at 1437-41.
Some states have explicitly refused to extend privacy rights under their state constitutions.
See State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 812-18, 413 A.2d 58, 66-69 (1980) (the Rhode Island
Constitution does not establish a right to privacy; sodomy conviction upheld); Sterling v.
Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) (unequivocally rejecting privacy "as a test of the
validity of laws").
38. These states include Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Montana and South Carolina. The
difficulty here is in the fact that the jurisprudence surrounding their privacy clauses is practically
nonexistent. This Note will confine its analysis to states in which sodomy is criminalized and
in which courts and commentators have created a dialogue about privacy rights which they
have yet to extend to protect lesbians and gay men. The other practical difficulty inherent in
this limited analysis is that, for the most part, the states with well-developed privacy doctrines
have liberal views on individual rights and have legislatures that have already decriminalized
sodomy.
39. See Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (invalidating a statute prohibiting fornication)
(discussed supra at notes 26-31 and accompanying text); Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395
A.2d 904 (extending privacy rights to consensual sodomy) (discussed supra at text and
accompanying notes 32-36); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1980) (invalidating a statute criminalizing consensual sodomy on federal grounds, ignoring
state grounds relied on below), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting deviate sexual
intercourse). Cases upholding such statutes include People v. Roberts, 256 Cal, App. 2d 488,
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The privacy rights protected by these states have usually tracked existing
federal privacy principles. Both the particular theories of privacy and legislative authority, and the context in which they have been used, must be
considered in determining the feasibility of challenges to state sodomy statutes.
Privacy theories articulated in one kind of case may not be amenable to
translation for the purpose of protecting the sexual privacy rights of lesbians
and gay men. This is the dilemma present in Texas' privacy jurisprudence.
1.

Privacy Rights Acknowledged by the Texas Supreme Court

The right to privacy in the Texas Constitution has not been used to
challenge the validity of Texas' sodomy statute.40 Indeed, privacy principles
have not been developed even to the level of the "penumbra" rights guaranteed by the federal doctrine.4 ' There is some faint hope, however, that
Texas courts may further develop a state constitutional privacy jurisprudence
along the lines of the autonomy-based rights model in New Jersey.
In Industrial Foundation v. Texas Industrial Accident Board,42 the Texas
Supreme Court utilized privacy principles in its decision to subject requests
for information from workers' compensation files made under the Open
Records Act to case-by-case in camera review. The court recognized "zones
of privacy" created by the federal and Texas Bill of Rights, 4 and cited
approvingly the Griswold line of cases," particularly the rights protected in
Roe v. Wade.4 1 It is the Court's characterization of these rights that inspires
a certain degree of hope for the future protection of sexual privacy rights.
Justice Doughty described the protections of Roe and the penumbra rights
as encompassing "intimate personal relationships or activities, freedoms of
the individual to make fundamental choices involving himself, his family,
and his relationships with others." 46 This statement of privacy rights does
not follow the view of the federal precedents of family and contraceptionbased principles narrowly articulated in Hardwick .47 Instead, these protections
64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); Kelly v. State, 45 Md. App. 212, 412 A.2d 1274 (1980), aff'd sub
nom. Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981); People v. Penn, 70 Mich. App.
638, 247 N.W.2d 575 (1976); and Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58.
Courts have also struck down consensual sex regulations on state constitutional vagueness
protection seems
grounds. See, e.g.,
Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971). However, this
tenuous at best when considering that legislatures need only reword their statutes to specify
exactly which acts are prohibited.
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989).
41. Harrington, The Texas Bill of Rights and Civil Liberties, 17 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1487,
1534 (1986).
42. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
43. Id.at 679.
44. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Industrial Found., 540 S.W.2d at 679; see also Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858,
859 (Tex. 1973) (the installation of a wiretap by the telephone company on a subscriber's
telephone was an unwarranted invasion of the right to privacy).
47. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186.
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are much more closely analogous to the autonomy-based theory adopted by
the New Jersey courts. The problem facing lesbian and gay rights advocates
will be in transferring these protections to a situation implicating perceptions
of morality and legislative authority.
The fact that Texas still has a statute that prohibits adult, private, consensual, homosexual sodomy is some indication that the courts and the legislature
believe that the state has a legitimate interest in supervising private morality.
This argument has not been challenged on the basis of state constitutional
privacy principles," probably due to the dearth of state law jurisprudence in
this area and the recently ended reliance on federal privacy doctrine. Although
the Texas Supreme Court has deviated somewhat from the federal enunciation
of privacy rights, the court grounded its holding in IndustrialFoundation on
federal precedent, possibly signifying a commitment to keep Texas' privacy
principles closely aligned with federal doctrine. If the Texas court does not
move further toward an autonomy-based model of interpretation-or if the
legislature does not move away from the regulation of adult, private, consensual activity-the sexual privacy of lesbians and gay men will remain
unprotected.
2.

State v. Gray: Minnesota Recognizes a
State Constitutional Right to Privacy

Unlike the Texas court, the Supreme Court of Minnesota explicitly stated
in State v. Gray4 9 that the Minnesota Bill of Rights protects privacy rights.
The court also refused to consider itself restricted by federal precedent in the
extension of these rights. "[W]e are not limited by United States Supreme
Court decisions .... [T]he protection we afford cannot be less than that
afforded by the Federal Constitution, but it is equally certain that we can
afford more protection under our constitution than is afforded under the
Federal Constitution." 50 Further, the court found that it was not restricted
to protecting only those fundamental rights expressly set out in the Minnesota
Constitution." These declarations lend encouragement to the idea that the
court may in the future extend constitutional protection to the sexual privacy
of lesbians and gay men.

48. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (upholding federal privacy
and equal protection challenges to the Texas sodomy statute), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). In denying a petition for a rehearing en banc, the
Fifth Circuit stated: "Moral issues should be resolved by the people, and the laws pertaining
thereto should be written or rescinded by the representatives of the people." 774 F.2d 1285,
1287 (5th Cir. 1985).
49. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id.
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In State v. Gray, the court upheld Minnesota's sodomy statute 2 despite its
recognition of state constitutional privacy rights. The Minnesota court's refusal
to extend protection to adult, consensual sexual activity actually conducted
in the privacy of the defendant's home is troubling in its similarity to the
Supreme Court's holding in Hardwick 3 but may not affect future privacy
law challenges.
The court created an exception to the state right to privacy for "commercial
sex," and distinguished Gray's conduct from truly private sexual activity
between consenting adults. 54 This distinction will undoubtedly aid gay rights
advocates in future attempts to have Minnesota's sodomy statute declared
unconstitutional because a challenge brought in a case with facts involving
non-commercial, private, adult, consensual activity will implicate none of the
court's concerns in Gray. The court's characterization of the protection
afforded by Minnesota's right to privacy is closer to the autonomy-based
interpretation of Saunders55 than the family-based federal right. Although the
court in Gray avoided the issue of whether the newly recognized state
constitutional right to privacy would protect heterosexual or homosexual
sodomy, its explicit recognition of privacy rights grounded in state constitutional law, and its careful method of distinguishing the facts of Gray, engender
optimism that the court will be receptive to future state privacy law challenges
to Minnesota's sodomy statute.

3.

Doubtful Applications of the New Jersey Approach
a.

Louisiana

Louisiana is one of the few states still criminalizing adult, private, consen56
sual sodomy whose constitution contains an explicit right to privacy. It
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987).
53. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
54. The defendant in Gray was convicted of having oral sex with a prostitute. The court
reasoned that the sexual acts, although conducted in private, were actually public in nature
because the parties did not know each other and because Gray paid for the sex. Gray, 413
N.W.2d at 113-14. Consent was also implicated because the complainant was a sixteen-yearold boy, but the court considered him a consenting adult because he lied about his age and
because Gray reasonably believed him to be eighteen years old. Id. at 113 n.5.
By creating a "commercial sex" distinction, the court side-stepped the issue of whether the
right to privacy protects adult, private, consensual sodomy. One commentator suggests that
the court created this distinction for the purpose of denying protection to the particular
defendant in this case. Recent Developments in Minnesota Law: Minnesota Recognizes a Right
of Privacy, 14 Wm. MiTCRELL L. REv. 193, 198 (1988) ("One can imply from the decision
that the reason the court did not address the issue was its unwillingness to let the Minnesota
Constitution protect an admitted sex offender.").
The court also refused to allow Gray standing to challenge the statute as facially overbroad
and thus implicating the rights of third parties, Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 112-13, even though the
Minnesota court had precedent for this type of argument in the context of first amendment
rights. See Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 311 Minn. 186, 248 N.W.2d 708 (1976).
55. See supra note 26.
56. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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seems unlikely, however, that Louisiana courts will be willing to extend the
privilege of sexual privacy beyond the limits announced in Hardwick,57 given
their consistent refusal to break with federal precedent even when offered
considerable textual and historical authority to do so. 8 The language of the
constitution's preamble could support an autonomy-based theory of privacy.5 9
However, the preamble's lack of status as law, the legislature's failure to
consider protecting private sexual activities when adopting the Declaration of
Rights in 1974 and the court's adherence to federal privacy jurisprudence all
point to a dismal outlook for future state constitutional privacy challenges
to Louisiana's sodomy statute. 60
b.

Missouri

In State v. Walsh, 61 the Missouri Supreme Court declined to consider
whether the privacy rights recognized in Missouri case law, emanating from
the Missouri Constitution, would require invalidating the Missouri sexual
misconduct statute. 62 The court refused to consider the argument because
the defendant failed to raise the "distinct nature of Missouri's right of
privacy apart from federal doctrines." 6 It is unlikely that a state challenge
would prevail, because, as the court pointed out, the Missouri right to
privacy has not even extended protection to the level reached by federal
privacy jurisprudence. 64 The cases enunciating the Missouri right to privacy
65
have generally involved protection against publication of private facts.
In Barber v. Time, Inc.," the court announced that a right to privacy is
present in, or grows out of, the Missouri Constitution. The court characterized this right as "the right to be let alone." 67 This gives advocates of
gay rights little guidance now in searching for authority in which to ground

57. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
58. See State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1983); Comment, supra note 36, at 791. This
Comment provides an in-depth analysis of all the provisions of the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights that could possibly be argued to strike down the state's sodomy statute.
59. "We, the people of Louisiana . . . desiring to protect individual rights to life, liberty,
and property; afford opportunity for the fullest development of the individual ... ." LA.
CoNsT. preamble.

60. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986). See Comment, supra note 36.
61. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
62. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979). Sexual misconduct is defined as deviate
sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex.
63. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 513.
64. Id. The court also suggested that it would be far from amenable to any challenge to
the sexual misconduct statute based on a non-originalist interpretation of the Missouri Constitution. Id.
65. See Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); Biederman's
of Springfield v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); State v. Nolan, 316 S.W.2d 630 (Mo.
1958); Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
66. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
67. Id. at 1205-06, 159 S.W.2d at 294.
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an autonomy-based interpretation of the right to privacy. Like the courts
of Texas, Missouri courts have taken a "hands off" non-interpretationalist
approach to privacy, leaving state constitutional principles undeveloped while
basing decisions on federal precedent. When taken together, these facts do
not bode well for future state privacy challenges to Missouri's sexual
misconduct statute.
The prevailing trend in state constitutional privacy analysis has been one
of non-interpretation. For the most part, state courts have failed to develop
a jurisprudence of privacy rights that can stand apart from federal doctrine
and that lends itself to challenges to statutes prohibiting private sexual
conduct between consenting adults. This problem is even more evident in
state equal protection jurisprudence.
II.

THE

EQUAL

PROTECTION ALTERNATIVE

Seven states limit their prohibitions against adult, private, consensual
sodomy to the sexual conduct of homosexuals .8 In the District of Columbia
and the other sixteen states with sodomy statutes, sodomy statutes are much
more frequently enforced against homosexuals, and thus can be shown to
be discriminatorily applied. 69 The Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to rule on the issue of whether these laws violate the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection, but any decision on this controversy by the Court is likely to be unfavorable to lesbians and gay men.
The Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick"° foreclosed one argument
for subjecting sodomy statutes to strict scrutiny by finding that no "fundamental right" was implicated by criminalizing homosexual sodomy. 7 ' State
and federal courts have demonstrated their reluctance to utilize the other
method of triggering strict scrutiny by refusing to grant homosexuals the
status of a "suspect class." 7 2 Thus, gay rights advocates are left the murky
alternative of state equal protection and the possibility of a different
conceptualization of what constitutes invidious classifications, rational relationships and legitimate state interests.
A.

A State ConstitutionalEqual Protection Model?

The closest that state equal protection jurisprudence has come to establishing a model for challenges to state sodomy statutes is the 1980 decision

68. ARK.

STAT. ANN.

§ 5-14-122 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-3505

(1988);

Ky. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979);
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 45-5-505 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986); TEx.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989).

69. See Note, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy
Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 811, 846 (1984).
70. 4.78 U.S. 186 (1986).
71. Id. at 190-91.
72. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio.71 Even
though a large number of states have equal protection clauses and equal
rights provisions in their constitutions, few courts in states that maintain
sodomy statutes have developed an equal protection jurisprudence distinct
from federal law.
Bonadio involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's deviate sexual intercourse
statute 4 by defendants who were arrested at a pornographic theater. 75 The
court held that the statute violated the equal protection clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions by creating a classification based on marital
status where such differential treatment was not supported by a state interest
bearing a rational relationship to the object of the statute.7 6 However, the
court based its ruling on the Supreme Court's holding in Eisenstadt v.
Baird" which prohibited a state from classifying on the basis of marital
78
status in outlawing the distribution of contraceptives.
The reasoning of the Pennsylvania court is problematic. In basing a state
law decision on federal equal protection precedent, the court allowed the.
later retrenchment of the federal judiciary in the area of individual rights
to cast doubt on the validity of its arguments. To its credit, however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the only state court which has used state
equal protection principles to strike down a statute prohibiting adult, private,
79
consensual homosexual conduct.
Before it considered the issue of equal protection, the court engaged in'
a discussion of the proper limits of the state police power over the individual,
quoting at length from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty.80 This discussion
sheds light on the court's theory of what constitutes a legitimate state
interest. "With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be 'exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from
interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce
a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others."i'
An interpretation of state interests, triggered by harm to others, will be

73. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
74. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. L. 1482, No. 334 § I (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3124 (Purdon 1973)).
75. Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 93, 415 A.2d at 49.
76. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 50.
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
78. Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
79. Id. at 98, 415 A.2d at 51. In People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), the Court of Appeals of New York
struck down the state's sodomy statute on federal equal protection and privacy grounds.
It is questionable whether the Pennsylvania Court based its holding on the adequate and
independent state grounds that would have been necessary to avoid Supreme Court review.
See supra note 34.
80. Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 96-98, 415 A.2d at 50-51 (citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-12 (E.
Rapaport ed. 1978)).
81. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50 (emphasis in original).
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vital to a state equal protection claim if the state refuses to recognize
homosexuals as a class meriting heightened scrutiny. Texas courts, however,
may very well extend a degree of scrutiny to sodomy statutes that rises at
least to that of federal middle-tier scrutiny.
B.

The Texas Courts and Equal Protection Analysis

The Texas Constitution contains two provisions designed to protect equal
rights. Although Texas courts have not expanded suspect classifications or
fundamental rights beyond those recognized by federal law,82 the Texas
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA")83 specifies suspect classifications in
constitutional terms. The jurisprudence surrounding the Texas ERA is
limited but noteworthy.
In Camarena v. Texas Employment Commission," a state district court
relied primarily on the Texas ERA to prohibit the exclusion of 150,000
agricultural laborers from the Unemployment Compensation Act.85 The court
characterized farm workers in Texas as an easily identifiable class of people
86
of Mexican origin, discrete and insular, and discriminated against by law.
The court's decision extended benefits to a disadvantaged minority that had
previously been excluded from protective social legislation. Although Camarena gives some hope that the principles of the Texas ERA will be
extended to protect lesbians and gay men, the dearth of cases and some
strong arguments for strict construction of the ERA present problems.
The Texas Supreme Court has not applied the ERA and it is unclear how
it would do so, although it has acknowledged its potential application in at
least two cases.8 7 A strict construction of the ERA would limit its applicability to protect Texans from discrimination only on the basis of the
classifications set out in the text, leaving lesbians and gay men without
protection. On the other hand, if the court creates balancing tests similar
(or dissimilar) to those used in federal equal protection jurisprudence, the
rights currently protected could be seriously weakened88 while the rights of
homosexuals could be bolstered, depending on how closely the court tracks

82. See Harrington, supra note 41, at 1511.
83. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.").
84. No. 369,808 & No. 369,808-A (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 201st Judicial Dist. of
Texas) (1985), modified, July 2, 1985 [No. 369,808] and May 15, 1985 [No. 369,808-A].
85. A similar exclusion was upheld under federal law in a New York case. Doe v. Hodgson,
344 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. Camarena, No. 369,808 & No. 369,808-A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
87. In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 801-03 (Tex. 1980); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d
665, 668 n.5 (rex. 1978).

88. See Harrington, supra note 41, at 1513. For an argument in favor of strict construction,

see Schoen, The Texas Equal Rights Amendment After the First Decade: JudicialDevelopments
1978-1982, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1321 (1983).
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federal tests. Even if the court strictly construes the Texas ERA, gay rights
advocates still have an alternative available in the equal protection provision.
The equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution 9 has been interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court to create its own version of the rational
basis test that approximates the level of scrutiny required by federal middletier analysis. In Whitworth v. Bynum, 9° the Texas Supreme Court invalidated
the state's automobile guest statute after stating that the Texas version of
the rational basis test required that "similarly situated individuals must be
treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational
basis for not doing so. '"91 The court went on to insist that the classification
92
not be overinclusive or create irrebuttable and unreasonable presumptions.
Although Whitworth could go a long way toward helping gay rights
advocates overcome the problems inherent in the traditional rational basis
standard, the same difficulty present in Texas privacy jurisprudence crops
up again here: perceptions of morality have not yet come up in the analysis
of Texas' equal protection clause. The Texas courts are perfectly free to
deny equal protection under a level of scrutiny higher than federal rational
basis review.
The Fifth Circuit, the federal appeals court to which Texas generally
looks for guidance in the equal protection area, concluded in Baker v.
Wade 3 that no federal constitutional rights are deprived by Texas' sodomy
statute. Furthermore, the court stated that "[tihe statute is directed at
certain conduct, not at a class of people. Though the conduct be the desire
of the bisexually or homosexually inclined, there is no necessity, that they
engage in it."94 This view of homosexual identity, that the conduct defines
the class, is one simple and self-perpett~ating way to rationalize upholding
sodomy statutes.9 5 As long as the Texas courts consider private morality a
proper concern of the legislature, they cin justify refusing to extend the
protection of an even more difficult standard than federal rational basis
scrutiny to the sexual privacy of lesbians and gay men. Without a more
extensively developed jurisprudence in the area of state constitutional equal
protection, advocates can only remind the state court that it has refused to

89. Tax. CoNsT. art. I, § 3 ("All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal
rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or

privileges, but in consideration of public services.").
90. 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985).

91. Id. at 197.
92. Id. The United States Supreme Court in 1929 had upheld the validity of automobile

guest laws in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
93. 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985).

94. Id. at 1287.
95. "If criminal or criminizable sodomy is the inevitable consequence or the essential
characteristic of homosexual identity, then the class of homosexuals is coterminous with a
class of criminals or at least of persons whose shared behavior is criminizable." Halley, supra
note 6, at 919.
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consider itself limited to the confines of federal equal protection in the past
and need not do so in the future.
CONCLUSION

It is time for the courts to realize that private, adult, consensual sexual
activity affects only the parties involved, and is of no concern to the public
generally. It is time for the courts to deregulate private homosexual conduct.
Many courts can do so with the tools of privacy and equal protection
dormant in their own state constitutions. A few courts have already gathered
the courage to delve into these waters of state constitutional law and have
forged a state jurisprudence with the strength to protect adults who engage
in private, consensual sexual activity. These courts have confined the reach
of legislative authority to public conduct, and have constructed a theory of
privacy based on rights of personality and a theory of homosexual identity
based upon complex political discourse. Following this model, judges and
rights advocates should develop a state constitutional jurisprudence that
protects lesbians and gay men from antihomosexual discrimination. It may
be a slow road, it may be that society's homophobic tendencies will be the
last form of hatred eradicated by law, but the means of change must now,
more than ever, come from the states.

